6. It is to be anticipated that the British General Staff will raise difficulties about extending relief to the South of the Amiens-Peronne road, desiring to retain the troops at their disposal for offensive action."

Sir Douglas Haig's proposal that the taking over of part of the French line, which was an essential element in the scheme for creating a mass of manoeuvre for the attack, should be conditional on British divisions being withdrawn from Salonika to make up the deficit created in Sir Douglas Haig's offensive power, was impracticable. It was a *A ludicrous* ludicrous proposition, having regard to *proposition* circumstances which must have been well known to the British Commander-in-Ghief. At that moment the French, British and Italian General Staffs were anticipating an over-whelming attack upon the Salonika position from the victorious forces of the Central Powers in the North. There was some ground for apprehending that the Greek Army was very much tempted to join in the enemy attack. General Joffre had urged us to send two more divisions to reinforce our contingent in that sphere. We were pressing the Italians to do the same thing. Sir William Robertson was actually making arrangements for sending a reinforcement of 15,000 men to Salonika. Sir Douglas Haig must have known all that and his proposal must have been made with

a view to upsetting the new plan. He must have known that even if ten divisions could have been drawn from Salonika they would not reach France before the middle or the end of February. He also knew that the reason assigned by us for refusing to agree to Joffre[9]s proposal that we should send two